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I. INTRODUCTION
To outside investors, the People's Republic of China (PRC)
often seems like a hungry tiger waiting to pounce on its next victim.
Investors are wary because information regarding Chinese trade
and investment policies is often scarce or contradictory.' More-
over, the mercurial nature of the PRC's economic development pol-
icy has frightened potential investors.2 For example, the 1979-80
cancellation of a large number of contracts relating to the Baoshan
Steel Plant created an atmosphere of caution and skepticism for
companies entering into contracts with the PRC.3 Skepticism is
compounded by the widely-held perception that Chinese contracts
lack legal enforceability despite the existing PRC judicial and arbi-
tration bodies.4
This reputation for non-performance of contracts stems from
the Vickers-Zimmer case and similar incidents in the late 1960s.1
The Vickers-Zimmer dispute arose out of a contract to build a pe-
trochemical plant in China.' In the original contract, Vickers-Zim-
mer and China agreed that in the event of a contractual dispute that
both sides would submit to arbitration in Stockholm.7 However,
when Chinese soldiers prevented Vickers-Zimmer from building its
plant, Vickers' request for arbitration was rejected and two of its
employees were arrested as spies.' Furthermore, in a later proceed-
ing from which Vickers-Zimmer was excluded, the company was
found liable for "failure" to fulfill its contractual obligations.9
Throughout the 1970s, accounts of purported Chinese efforts
to avoid arbitration and reject requests for dispute resolution per-
meated the international investment community, raising doubts
1. "The majority of [PRC] legislation [is] frequently plagued by ambiguities and con-
tradictions." Richard J. Goossen, Non-judicial Dispute Resolution in the People's Republic of
China, Bus. L. REV. 331, 335 (1986); "The most striking thing to the newcomer to the Chi-
nese business environment and legal environment is there's no ready proof that China has a
legal system in the conventional Western sense." Nancy L. Ross, Veteran China Hands Offer
Some Advise to Businessmen, WASH. POST, April 9, 1978, at K2 (quoting former Harvard
Law School Associate Dean Jerome Cohen).
2. See Goossen, supra note 1.
3. Jerome Alan Cohen and Stuart J. Valentine, Foreign Direct Investment in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China: Progress, Problems, and Proposals, 1 J. CHINESE L. 161, 202 (1987).
4. Id.
5. See Jerome Alan Cohen, The Role of Arbitration in Economic Co-operation with
China, in FOREIGN TRADE INVESTMENT AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 508-509 (Michael J. Moser ed., 1987).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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about China's reliability as a business partner.10
This comment discusses the reliability of arbitration as a means
of dispute resolution for foreign parties engaged in technology
transfers with China. Part one describes the various types of tech-
nology transfers to the PRC, followed by a discussion of the
problems and possible preventive measures for use in negotiations
involving negotiating arbitration clauses in contracts dealing with
Chinese businesses. Part two describes the Chinese arbitrational
structure and process. The conclusion analyzes the viability of the
Chinese arbitration system as a forum for resolving disputes in cases
concerning foreign technology transfers to China.
II. BACKGROUND
One of the PRC's major concerns in the 1950s was to develop
its technological and industrial base."1 Unfortunately, China lacked
expertise and equipment to design, build, and operate modern man-
ufacturing plants.12 As a result, China depended upon its "Big
Brother," the Soviet Union, as its primary source of technology and
aid. 3 By 1960, the Soviets had supplied the Chinese with enough
expertise to build 130 industrial projects. 4 However, as a result of
deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1960s, the Soviets
withdrew their technical support and China was unable to continue
these projects." Accordingly, the importance of technological ad-
vancement and self-reliance were reflected in China's political and
economic policies.16
Between 1973 and 1978, the PRC began importing heavy ma-
chinery to support large technical projects from the most reputable
corporations, including airplanes from McDonald Douglas, micro-
computers from Wang computers, petrochemical plant construc-
tion, and joint ventures for production of locomotives.' 7 In addi-
tion, China decentralized its highly structured and rigid foreign
trade system by increasing the number Chinese entities permitted to
10. See Cohen, supra note 5.
11. See CRAIG DIETRICH, PEOPLE'S CHINA: A BRIEF HISTORY 84-85 (1986).
12. Id. at 85.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id at 138-141.
16. China is "determined to be as self-sufficient as possible and trades only to make a
political point or to acquire modem equipment it cannot easily make itself." Jay Mathews,
Chinese Are Expected to Increase Trade With Rest of World Slowly, WASH. PosT, January 9,
1977, at G7.
17. Id.
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enter into technology transfer agreements with foreigners.' 8 Unfor-
tunately, while decentralization increased the speed of technology
transfers, many of these transfers were either unnecessary or
useless. 19
In 1984, China established a single administrative authority,
the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
(MOFERT), to govern over foreign trade in China and to effectuate
efforts to re-centralize.20 Furthermore, the PRC developed a new
industrial policy to meet China's needs in the 1990s. There are four
primary goals which dominate this policy: 1) by the year 2000, to
reach level of technological development comparable to that which
Western industrialized nations had achieved in 1990; 2) disseminate
technology into rural areas; 3) develop infrastructure and natural
resources; and 4) promote high technology in the areas of com-
puters, electronic, biotechnology, laser, robotics, and space and sea
exploration.21
A. Forms of Technology Transfers in the PRC
1. Pure Licensing Agreements
Pure licensing agreements for technology or industrial prop-
erty are the inexpensive alternative available to foreign investors in-
terested in investments in China.22 These contracts are relatively
risk-free and involve a minimal level of continuing cooperation on
the part of the transferor.23 However, the benefits of licensing con-
tracts are often negated by Chinese demands that the transferor
guarantee the quality of the product manufactured by the trans-
ferred technology.24 Furthermore, the transferor may be required
to assume responsibility for any other machinery and equipment in-
volved, whether or not the transferor manufactures it.25
18. Id.
19. DIETRICH, supra note 11, at 257.
20. Interview with Professor Anna Han, Associate Professor, Santa Clara University
School of Law (Apr. 8, 1992) (hereinafter Han Lecture).
21. Id.
22. Stanley B. Lubman & Gregory C. Wajnowski, Technology Transfer to the People's
Republic of China: Practice and Policy, in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA § 3.02[l] (William P.
Streng & Allen D. Wilcox eds., 1992).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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2. Compensation Trade/Countertrade Transactions
In a typical countertrade transaction,26 the foreigner supplies
equipment or licenses technology, in return for repayment by the
PRC in product.27 This type of transaction is often pursued by
companies in need of raw materials or low cost labor.28 Moreover,
the Chinese strongly encourage investors to engage in countertrade
because such transactions conserve China's foreign currency
reserves.
29
3. Contribution of Technology to a Joint Venture
Technology transfers are one of China's primary goals in en-
couraging joint ventures. In these agreements, the transferred tech-
nology is a significant portion of a foreign joint venture partner's
total capital contribution. Equity joint ventures and Sino-contrac-
tual joint ventures (also referred to as "foreign cooperative enter-
prises") are two types of joint ventures used in Chinese business. 30
a. Equity Joint Ventures
A equity joint venture is a limited liability company in which
each investor's liability is limited to their original capital invest-
ment.31 Each investor in an equity joint venture must contribute at
least 25 percent and not more than 99 percent of the total invest-
ment32 "in cash or kind." Thus, the investor's proportionate capital
26. In China, countertrade may be conducted under various methods. Countertrade
structures include barter, buy-back or direct compensation trade, counter purchase or indi-
rect compensation, advance purchase, offset, government-to-government trade agreements,
clearing agreements, and switch transactions. See S. Linn Williams & Clark D. Stith,
Countertrade, in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA § 10.04 (William P. Streng & Allen D. Wilcox
eds., 1992).
27. Lubman and Wajnowski, supra note 22, at § 3.02[4].
28. Williams & Stith, supra note 26, § 10.01.
29. See id § 10.02[1].
30. Compare Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign Co-operative En-
terprises, I China Bus. Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 6-100 (1988) [hereinafter
Contractual Joint Ventures] with Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign Joint
Equity Enterprises, I China Bus. Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 6-500 (1988)
and Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, 1 China Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH
Austl. Ltd.) 6-550 (1983).
Another entity that promotes technology transfers in China is the wholly foreign-owned
enterprises. These wholly foreign-owned enterprises are beyond the scope of this Comment.
Interested readers are referred to the Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning
Enterprises with Sole Foreign Investment, 2 China Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.)
13-506 (1986) [hereinafter, Foreign Investment].
31. Joint Venture Regulations, supra note 30, 6-550(19).
32. "In March 1987, Provisional Regulations of the State of Administration for Indus-
1993]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY L4W JOURNAL
contribution may consist of foreign currency, technology and/or
equipment.33 All parties who wish to invest in China must comply
with technology transfers in the form of equipment, "know-how"34
or training of scientific management, technical and managerial per-
sonnel.35 The normal duration of an equity joint venture is between
ten and thirty years, but this term may be extended to fifty years
with special approval.36 At liquidation, the assets are distributed
"among the parties to the joint venture according to the proportion
of each party's investment unless otherwise provided by agreement,
contract or the articles of association.",37
b. Contractual Joint Ventures
These Sino-foreign co-operative joint ventures are governed by
the "Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign Co-
operative Enterprises. ' 38 The purpose of this regulation is to ex-
pand and facilitate cooperation and technological exchanges be-
tween foreign entities and China.39 The structure of a cooperative
joint venture provides greater flexibility to the contracting parties
than equity joint ventures.4° For example, foreign investors may
invest as little or as much as the parties agree upon.41 In contrast to
equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures permit partners to
recoup their investment and depreciation expenses during the ven-
ture period.42 In choosing whether to enter into a equity joint ven-
ture or a contractual joint venture, the foreign investor should
try and Commerce Concerning the Proportion of Registered Capital to Total Investment of
Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures were promulgated. These regulations establish registered capital
requirements for equity ventures of different sizes." Michael W.T. Chan, Business Ventures
in the People's Republic of China, in INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY JOINT VENTURES IN
THE COUNTRIES OF THE PACIFIC RIM 61, 64 (James A. Dobkins ed., 1988).
33. Joint Venture Regulations, supra note 30, 6-550(3).
34. "Know-how" is described as technical knowledge which has not been made public
and is used for manufacturing, product design, quality control or management and technical
process." Anna Han, China's New Regulations for Technology Import Contracts: An Evolving
Primer For Technology Transfers to China 3 (April 1988) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with Professor Anna Han, Santa Clara University, School of Law).
35. Joint Venture Regulations, supra note 30, 6-550(4).
36. Id. 6-550(100) (as amended in 1986).
37. Id.
38. Contractual Joint Ventures, supra note 30.
39. Id. 6-100(1).
40. The parties may choose not to create a legal "person" with limited liability and set
forth all duties, rights and liabilities through contractual negotiation. Cohen & Valentine,
supra note 3, at 180. However, "in some instances, the [contractual joint venture] is a legal
entity with its own articles of association and board of directors, and occasionally even lim-
ited liability." Id.
41. Id.
42. See Contractual Joint Ventures, supra note 30, 6-100 (22).
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consider tax implications and foreign exchange repatriation.43
B. Rules and Regulations
Prior to 1985, the PRC had no established legislative regula-
tions governing the transfer of technology.A Thus, negotiations for
technology transfer through capital contributions and other means
occurred without the benefit of published legal guidelines or state
approval.45 Often these technology transfers were made by Chinese
authorities on an ad hoc basis." Consequently, foreign investors
were subject to contradictory investment requirements and uncer-
tain prospects for success. 47
Due to the increased volume and complexity of technology
transferred into the PRC, the Chinese legislature promulgated a
number of regulations to handle technology transfers more effec-
tively.48 In 1985, "Regulations on Administration of Technology
Import Contracts of the People's Republic of China" (Technology
Regulations)49 were promulgated, setting forth general guidelines
for technology transfers. In 1987, "Detailed Rules for the Imple-
mentation of the Administrative Regulations of the People's Repub-
lic of China on the Control of Technology Import Contracts"
(Implementing Regulations) were promulgated. 50 In contrast to the
Technology Regulations, which basically provided for contracts
dealing with patent know-how,51 the Implementing Regulations
have broadened the contract scope to include the transfer of propri-
etary technology and trade secrets.52
All contracts are subject to explicit requirements for technol-
ogy import contracts. These contracts must include:
1. Name of the contract;
43. See Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 205. The problems of foreign exchange
repatriation and the tax consequence associated with it will not be discussed in this comment.
44. Lubman & Wajnowski, supra note 22, at § 3.04.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id. §§ 3.03[3]-3.04.
48. Id. § 3.04.
49. Regulations on the Administration of Technology Import Contracts of the People's
Republic of China, 1 China Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) % 5-570 (1985) [herein-
after Technology Regulations].
50. Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Administrative Regulations of the
People's Republic of China on the Control of Technology Import Contracts, 1 China Laws
for Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 5-573 (1987) [hereinafter Implementing Regulations].
51. Technology Regulations, supra note 49, 5-570(2).
52. Implementing Regulations, supra note 50, % 5-573(2). This includes technical ser-
vice contracts, whereby the licensor is authorized to use a specified technology to provide
service or consultation. Id.
19931
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2. Description, scope and requirements of the technology to be
imported;
3. Criteria, time limits and standards for assessing and examin-
ing the apportionment of liability for risk and measures to be
adopted;
4. Obligation of confidentiality with regards to the imported
technology, and the ownership and sharing of improvements to
the technology
5. Total price and enumeration, price of individual items and
form of payment;
6. Method of computing the amount of damages for breach of a
contract;
7. Methods for the resolutions of dispute; and
8. Definitions of technical terminology. 3
The Technology Regulations also set forth guidelines limiting
the types of technology that will be approved for import and imple-
mentation in China. For example, "technology to be imported
must be advanced and appropriate" and is required to comply with
at least one of the following goals:
1. Developing new products;
2. Improving product performance, reducing the cost of product
performance, reducing the cost of products and conserving en-
ergy or raw material;
3. Favorable to maximizing the utilization of local resources;
4. Enhancing foreign exchange earnings;
5. Favorable to environmental protection;
6. Favorable to production safety;
7. Improving management; and
8. Upgrading scientific and technical standards. 54
However, current administrative practices and policies provide
little direction for foreign investors as to which of these eight factors
will be given greatest emphasis by Chinese officials. Nonetheless, it
seems likely that contracts that foster the basic policy objectives of
the PRC would be more likely to again approval. Technology con-
tracts such as those which promote the development of new prod-
ucts for export or increase foreign exchange earnings, are more
likely to be approved, because these factors comport with the basic
policy objectives of the PRC.
The requirement that the technology be advanced underlies the
PRC's concern that the imported technology be current." Such
53. Id. 1 5-573(7).
54. Technology Regulations, supra note 49, % 5-570(3).
55. See Joint Venture Regulations, supra note 30, q% 6-550(3)-(4).
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concerns demonstrate that Chinese authorities are very wary about
being "stuck" with the West's outdated technology.5 6 Conse-
quently, determining whether a proposed transfer involves "state of
the art" technology has become a major issue in the approval pro-
cess.57 The PRC has often preferred to license the most technologi-
cally advanced knowledge or product, despite the limited utility of
such knowledge may have in China.58 For example, new technol-
ogy is often incompatible with existing manufacturing plants or
computer systems within the PRC. 9
The PRC's insistence on the imposition of warranty provisions
upon foreign transferor has been incorporated into the Technology
Regulations and the Implementing RegulationsY' The transferor
must guarantee lawful ownership and to compensate the PRC for
any and all losses resulting from an intellectual property infringe-
ment claim. 61 Furthermore, the transferor must warrant that the
technology or documents, and information provided are "complete,
correct, valid and capable of accomplishing the technical targets
prescribed in the contract. 62
The Technology and Implementing Regulations both include
provisions which invalidate all contracts which place unreasonably
restrictive requirements upon the Chinese party. 63 The underlying
purpose behind these restrictions is to protect the PRC from the
exploitation by unscrupulous foreigners. For example, a transferor
may not include any of the following clauses in a technology con-
tract, without first obtaining special approval:
1. Include in the contract additional conditions which are rele-
vant to the technology being imported, such as requiring the
transferee to purchase unnecessary technology, technical serv-
ices, raw material, equipment and products;
2. Restrict the transferee's freedom of choice to obtain raw
materials, parts components or equipment from other sources.
3. Restricting the transferee's development and improvement of
imported technology;
4. Restricting the transferee's acquisition of similar or compet-
ing technology from other sources;
56. Han Lecture, supra note 20.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Implementing Regulations, supra note 50, T 5-573(11).
62. Id. $ 5-573(9).
63. Technology Regulations, supra fiote 49, t 5-570(9); Implementing Regulations,
supra note 50, $ 5-573(18).
1993]
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5. Imposing unequal terms of exchange upon the transferee of
improvements of the imported technology.
6. Restrict the imported technologies quantity, variety and sales
price of products to be manufactured by the transferee;
7. Restrict unreasonably the transferee's sales channels and ex-
port markets;
8. Forbid use by the transferee of the imported technology after
the expiration of the contract; or
9. Require the transferee to pay for or to undertake obligations
for patents which are unused or no longer effectivef 4
Every agreement or joint venture contract containing a tech-
nology transfer component must be approved by the Chinese gov-
ernment.65 This is often a lengthy and frustrating process, due to
the presence of various barriers which must be overcome. 6 The
first barrier a transferor must address is determining which Chinese
entity has approval authority. This is a difficult determination de-
spite the intent of the Implementing Regulations to provide some
clarity. However, as a general rule, joint venture contracts require
approval by MOFERT or its local designee or bureau.67
Pursuant to Article 6 of the Implementing Regulations, if a
local agency has approved the joint venture feasibility study, the
local agency retains the power to examine and approve the final
contract.68 Accordingly, in order to determine who has approval
authority, the transferee and the transferor must first determine the
appropriate authority for reviewing the feasibility study.69 This is a
crucial determination because the feasibility study and project pro-
posal must be approved by the proper Chinese authority, before the
transferor and transferee can negotiate a technology transfer
agreement.7°
The key factors in this determination are the project's location
and its total value.7' For most projects involving a feasibility study
less than $5,000,000 (U.S. dollars), approval may be obtained from
the ministry under whose authority the project is being under-
taken.72 Projects between $5,000,000 and $50,000,000 (U.S. dol-
lars) require approval by a ministry level entity or by MOFERT
64. Technology Regulations, supra note 49, 5-570(9).
65. Lubman & Wajnowski, supra note 22, at § 3.04[4].
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Lubman & Wajnowski, supra note 22, at § 3.04[4].
71. Id.
72. Id.
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(located in Beijing).7 3 When a large project is involved and the total
project value exceeds one hundred million dollars, approval by
MOFERT and the State Council is imperative.74
The location of the project is also a factor in determining the
appropriate approval authority. The PRC has granted independent
approval authority for projects involving at least $30,000,000 U.S.
dollars to the cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Dalian, Tianjin, and
Guangzhou.75 In addition, special economic zones (SEZ) have au-
tonomous approval authority and a core of separate and distinct
technology transfer regulations.76
Once negotiations are concluded, the contract will not be vali-
dated until it is scrutinized by the approving authority for compli-
ance with the Implementing Regulations." The Implementing
Regulations require MOFERT or the appropriate authority to
make a decision on the contract within fifty days, or it is deemed
approved.78 However, it is questionable whether the Chinese will
honor a contract that has been approved by this default provision.
Without the proper approval signatures and stamps, the necessary
Chinese entities may be unwilling to cooperate. Authorization is
required to implement any foreign project.79 Often, the approval
authority determines that the parties must make specific amend-
ments to the contract within a specified period before their contract
will be approved. 80
Although joint venture enterprises engage in technology trans-
fer, the PRC has expressly exempted equity, contractual and wholly
owned enterprises from the scope of the Technology Implementing
Regulations.81 The governing law for technology transferred as
capital contribution in a joint venture is the "Regulations for the
Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment" (Joint Ven-
ture Regulations).82 However, foreign parties can expect joint ven-
ture contracts involving technology transfers to be similarly
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Lubman & Wajnowski, supra note 22, at § 3.04[4].
76. See Stanley B. Lubman & H. Zheng, The Special Economic Zones and Coastal Cit-
ies, in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA § 20 (William P. Streng & Allen D. Wilcox eds., 1992).
77. See Jesse T.H. Chang & Elson Pow, Technology Transfer to China, EAST ASIAN
EXECUTIVE REP., Jan. 15, 1986, at 8.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Han, supra note 34, at 3.
82. Joint Venture Regulations, supra note 30.
1993]
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scrutinized as if the Implementing Regulations were applied. This
is perhaps due to the fact that MOFERT and the provincial ap-
proval entities for joint venture contracts are the agencies most
often involved in approving contracts that fall under the Technol-
ogy Regulations and the Joint Venture Regulations. In fact, the
provisions for the capital investment contributions of technology in
joint venture contracts encompass many of the same clauses as the
Technology Regulations.13
III. DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES FOR TECHNOLOGY
CONTRACTS AND JOINT VENTURE CONTRACTS WITH
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER COMPONENTS
The "Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Repub-
lic of China (FECL)84 has established standards for settling all con-
tract disputes involving foreign investors. The regulation
establishes basic resolution procedures for use in the event of a dis-
pute. Under this regulation, "[a]ny disputes arising from the con-
tract ought to be settled by the parties, if possible, through
consultation or mediation of a third party." 5 However, if the dis-
pute cannot be resolved by consultation or mediation, the dispute
may be settled by arbitration, or by suit in the People's Court if
"neither an arbitration clause is provided in the contract nor a writ-
ten agreement [to arbitrate] is reached afterwards."86
Due to the loosely drafted joint venture regulations, many is-
sues are left open to contract negotiation, including alternative
means of dispute resolution. Consequently, international law and
practice must fill the contractual and regulatory gaps. This allows
the joint venture partners to decide issues not covered by Chinese
law. Examples include the language used in the contract, the choice
of venue for arbitration, and the amount of liquidated damages.
This enables the parties to draw on international law to resolve dis-
putes, should conflicts arise.8 7 Further, FECL expressly permits
contract provisions based on international treaties which the PRC
has participated in or concluded to differ from PRC laws.A
83. Compare Technology Regulations, supra note 49 with Joint Venture Regulations,
supra note 30.
84. Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, I China Laws
for Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 5-550 (1985) [hereinafter FECL].
85. Id. 5-500(37).
86. Id. 5-550(38).
87. Goossen, supra note 1, at 332.
88. FECL, supra note 84, 5-550(6) (except treaty clauses to which the PRC has de-
clared reservation).
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A. Problems and Solutions for Negotiation of Dispute
Resolution Clauses
Although the broad language of the joint venture laws and
FECL implies that there is a tremendous amount of freedom for
contracting in drafting their joint venture agreements, this is not
necessarily true. Foreign investors have limited autonomy because
China's approval process is "plagued by confusion, bureaucratic in-
conveniences, and excessively rigid policy."89This lack of autonomy
is evident from MOFERT's model contract, which sets forth a form
contract which includes China's position on issues regarding dis-
pute resolution." Consequently, if an arbitration clause is omitted
from the contract, MOFERT may be reluctant to approve the joint
venture. Moreover, even though the joint venture regulations pro-
vide for dispute resolution in the courts, none of the model clauses
offers this alternative.91 In addition, foreign treaties entered into by
China make it clear that conciliation and arbitration are in fact fa-
vored methods of dispute resolution.92 FECL allows parties to ini-
tiate a suit only in the absence of an agreement to arbitrate; a party
may not go to court if there is such an arbitral agreement. 93
The PRC has often claimed that a choice of forum is available
to foreign investors, because Chinese law states that arbitration can
take place in the defendant's domicile or where the dispute arose.94
However, the PRC will always attempt to make the determination
that the dispute arose in China.95 Therefore, the arbitration will
89. Chan, supra note 32, at 62.
90. See Christan Sakibaing, Dispute Settlement in China, in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA
§ 21.05(1) (William P. Streng & Allen D. Wilcox eds., 1992); the model contract is reprinted
in English in COMMERCIAL, BUSINESS, & TRADE LAWS: THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, booklet 27,28 (Owen D. Nee Jr., et al eds, 1983). This form contract was created as a
starting point for joint venture negotiations and was in part drafted to protect the interests of
the PRC. Salbaing, § 21.05[1]
91. The model clauses have been interpreted to involve the courts in only the enforce-
ment of the resolution. Walter Sterling Survey, Dispute Settlement in U.S. - China Trade -
Another Look, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 277 (1985).
92. "Article 8 of the Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement which was signed on 5 January
1974 provides for recourse to friendly consultation to resolve disputes, followed by arbitration
if negotiation fails. Similarly, Article VIII of the US-China Trade Agreement emphasizes
that the friendly negotiation and conciliation processes should be attempted before arbitra-
tion is adopted." ERIC LEE, COMMERCIAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN CHINA 10 (1985). See
Agreement on Trade Relations, July 7, 1979, U.S.-P.R.C., art. VIII, 31 U.S.T. 4651. The U.S
and the P.R.C. agreed to settle any dispute arising from or in relation to their contracts
through friendly consultation, conciliation, or mutually acceptable means, including interna-
tional third party arbitration. Goossen, supra note 1, at 332.
93. FECL, supra note 84, 5-550(37)-(38).
94. See Goossen, supra note 1, at 334.
95. See id.
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nearly always take place in China.96 For example, the PRC always
takes the position of defendant itself so that it can invoke the clause
for permitting the arbitration to occur in the defendant's domicile.
Alternatively, if the place of arbitration is decided on the basis of
where the dispute arose, it is inevitable that the arbitration will take
place in China.
As the model contracts do not offer a choice of forum in the
arbitration clauses, an increasing number of Chinese recipients are
asking that arbitration take place in Beijing under the auspices of
the Foreign Economic Trade Arbitration Commission (FETAC) in
China.9 7 An investor who does not wish to arbitrate under FETAC
should specify the place of arbitration at the outset of negotiations.
When the contract is silent as to the location of the dispute forum
and choice of law, the law of the country which has the "closest
connection" with the contract will be applied as set forth by the
FECL.98 Consequently, almost all joint venture contracts in which
technology is imported for use in China will be deemed as having
the closest connection to China. 99
Dispute resolution clauses are negotiable," °° and MOFERT
has approved contracts where the agreed location of arbitration is
outside of China and governed by an arbitration organization other
than FETAC.101 Most sample contracts permit third country arbi-
tration if consultation has failed to resolve the dispute.10 2 In fact,
MOFERT continually has approved third country arbitration in
Sweden under the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 10 3 the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Laws (UNCITRAL)
rules,"4 in Zurich under Swiss arbitration," 5 in Hong Kong under
96. See id.
97. Han, supra note 34, at 8.
98. FECL, supra note 84, 5-550(5).
99. Han, supra note 34, at 8.
100. Id. at 8.
101. See e.g., FECL, supra note 84, 1 5-550(35).
102. Anne Judith Farina, Comment, "Talking Disputes into Harmony" China Ap.
proaches International Commercial Arbitration, 4 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 137, 167
(1989).
103. "Any dispute 'shall be settled though friendly consultation between the parties;' but
if settlement cannot be reached, the dispute shall be submitted for arbitration." Abitration is
to take place in Stockholm, Sweden, under the auspices of the Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce." CHARLES A. BROWER & LEE R. MARKS, INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 245 (1983) (providing an summary of a typical arbitra-
tion clause used between a U.S. party and a PRC governmental entity).
104. Han, supra note 34, at 8.
105. Id.
[Vol. 9
CHINESE ARBIT TION
the Hong Kong Arbitration Center,10 6 and most recently under the
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID). 0 7
UNCITRAL has been the accepted arena for dispute resolu-
tion since 1979, when the United States and the PRC signed a trade
agreement. 108 Article 8 of the Trade Agreement, which addresses
dispute settlement, provides that:
The Contracting Parties encourage the prompt and equitable set-
tlement of disputes arising from or in relation to contracts be-
tween their respective firms, companies, corporations, and trade
organizations through friendly consultations, conciliations, and
other mutually acceptable means.109
If a dispute cannot be resolved promptly through consultation
or conciliation, the treaty provides that the parties may submit to
arbitration in the People's Republic of China, the United States or a
third country.10 The rules of procedure of the relevant arbitral in-
stitutions are either those of UNCITRAL or any other rules of pro-
cedure agreed upon by the two parties."'
Hong Kong has also been approved for third party arbitration
through the Hong Kong Arbitration Center." 2 Use of this Center
may be advantageous to a foreign investor for various reasons, in-
cluding the great expertise of Hong Kong arbitrators in Chinese law
and investment practices (these arbitrators have more experience in
dealing with Chinese laws and practices than any other third coun-
try tribunal). 1 3 In addition, Chinese language translation and in-
terpretation services are readily accessible in Hong Kong." 4
106. Goossen, supra note 1, at 335.
107. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States of 1966, opened for signature March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S.
159 [hereinafter ICSID]. The ICSID was established by convention, in 1966. It was intended
to address settlement of disputes between states and nationals of other states under the spon-
sorship of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). The
convention provides short-cuts to resolution of disputes between host states and investors of
other states. Although China has been a member of the World bank, it has not been until
recently that China agreed to participate in ICSID.
108. See Agreement on Trade Relations between the U.S. and the P.R.C., executed July
7, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4651, T.I.A.S. No. 9630.
109. Id.
110. Harold Sacks, Arbitration of Disputes Between The People's Republic Of China and
US. Corporations, in ARBITRATION AND THE LICENSING PROCEss 5-83, 5-91 (Robert Gold-
scheider and Michel de Hass eds., 1984).
111. Id.
112. Goossen, supra note 1, at 335.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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In China, contract conciliation and mediation proceedings
must be held prior to the initiation of arbitration.115 These proceed-
ings involve the inherent risks that friendly conciliation may con-
tinue to the point at which the parties are denied an opportunity to
conclude the dispute through a determination based on the merits
of the case."I6 Thus, in order to ensure the speedy determination of
a dispute, joint venture investors should specify a time limitation for
conciliation proceedings before commencing arbitration.I 7 For ex-
ample, the parties may agree that, if after ninety days the concilia-
tion process has proven ineffective, either party may initiate
arbitration proceedings."' In most cases, if investors keep
MOFERT informed on the progression of the negotiations, it is
very likely that the foreign party will be able to negotiate a contract
that is agreeable to both the Chinese party and MOFERT." 9 How-
ever, if the parties did not negotiate a contract for arbitration in a
third country, foreign companies may look to the PRC arbitration
system for resolution of disputes which arise during the course of
the transaction. 20
IV. ARBITRATION IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
In the 1950s the China Council for the Promotion of Interna-
tional Trade (CCPIT) established two entities to handle arbitration
proceedings between Chinese and foreign parties.' 2' All maritime
related disputes are resolved by the Maritime Arbitration Commis-
sion (MAC).' 22 Arbitration arising out of unresolvable disputes
over joint venture contracts, patents and related know-how, and
trademarks fall under the auspices of FETAC.'23 FETAC's main
office is located in Beijing, but disputes may also be heard in the
branch offices located in Shanghai and Shenzhen.' 24
115. FECL, supra note 84, 1 5-550(37).
116. See Thomas Peele & Marsha A. Cohen, Dispute Resolution in China, CHINA Bus.
REV., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 46, 48-49.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. See FECL, supra note 84, S 5-500(37).
121. LEE, supra note 92, at 15.
122. MAC was established by CCPIT in 1958 to handle maritime disputes involving
foreign parties. Id. at 13. This comment will not discuss MAC.
123. The Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (FTAC) renamed FETAC was estab-
lished by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) in 1954 to
handle arbitration between a Chinese party and a foreign party. Id. at 21.
124. Interview with Xu Sanqiao, Legal advisor to the China International Economic and
Trade Arbitration Commission, Shenzhen Commission, in Shenzhen, PRC (August 5, 1991)
[hereinafter Sanqiao Interview].
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FETAC's procedural rules are administered during every arbi-
tration session involving Chinese and foreign parties.12 5 Moreover,
because, FETAC is supervised by CCPIT, which is in turn super-
vised by MOFERT, the rules and procedures administered by
FETAC are influenced by national policies. 126 These procedural
rules are set forth in the revised Arbitration Provisions of the China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission
(CIETAC). 127
Although these procedures were enacted to promote foreign in-
vestment in China, investors are still skeptical about the reliability
of the Chinese arbitration process. 128 This uneasiness is primarily a
product of investor ignorance in the process and a history of failed
business relations. 129  This apprehension stems from three main
concerns: 1) whether the Chinese arbitration process is unbiased, so
that foreign parties are ensured a fair resolution of the issue; 2)
whether the process is capable of resolving the issues that may arise
in a contracts dealing with technical complexities; and 3) whether
the foreign party will be able to enforce a judgment award decree by
the arbitrational tribunal.
A. Can Foreign Parties Obtain Fair Resolution of Disputes?
Recent revisions have greatly improved the position of a for-
eign investor in the arbitration process. For example, each party
has now the right to select an arbitrator from the official list of arbi-
trators. 130 Before applying for formal arbitration, the plaintiff may
select one arbitrator; after receiving the arbitration form, the de-
fendant may nominate one arbitrator.1 31 However, neither party
may choose an arbitrator whose name does not appear on the offi-
cial list of arbitrators list.1 32 Upon request, either side may also
defer selection of their arbitrator to FETAC. 133 A third arbitrator
who acts as the presiding arbitrator, is appointed by the chairman
125. Goossen, supra note 1, at 331.
126. Farina, supra note 102, at 152-53.
127. These rules were adopted in September of 1988 by CCPIT and effective on January
1, 1989. Arbitration Provisions of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission, 2 China Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 1 10-505 (1988) [hereinafter
Arbitration].
128. Sacks, supra note 110, at 5-86.
129. Id.
130. See Arbitration, supra note 127, 55 10-505(3)-(8). This list is comprised of arbitra-
tors appointed by CCPIT, pursuant to the procedural rules of FETAC. Id. 1 10-505(4).
131. Id. 11 10-505(3)-(8).
132. Id.
133. Id.
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of FETAC. 134
FETAC's arbitrators list includes both Chinese and foreign
persons with "professional knowledge and actual experience in in-
ternational economics and trade, and science and technology."' 135
Since the effective date of the new rules, the arbitrators list has been
updated and is increasingly composed of foreign members.13 6 The
opportunity to select foreign, as well as Chinese arbitrators should
lend balance to the arbitration tribunal. 137
However, the arbitral voting process may be less fair than the
selection process, because arbitration awards are based on a major-
ity vote of the three-person arbitration tribunal. 138 While FETAC
presiding arbitrator has a duty to be unbiased, as a member of
CIETAC, he is also overseen by a superior authority and may be
compelled to vote in accordance with its wishes. 139 Consequently,
legal practitioners disfavor arbitration in China because they believe
their interests will only be represented by a minority vote on the
arbitration panel.1" Nevertheless, the number of judgments favor-
ing foreign parties has greatly increased since the reformation of the
FETAC procedural rules.1 41 The increase in the number of judg-
ment awards for foreign parties, combined with China's current
policies intended to encourage foreign investment and technical de-
velopment, seems to indicate that the PRC is attempting to make
FETAC a more attractive alternative to foreign investors. 42
Arbitration hearings are conducted as conferences.14 3 Conse-
quently, a party will never have a case thrown out, or its claim dis-
missed, due to ignorance of FETAC procedures.'" In fact, the
disputing parties may confer with FETAC on matters relating to
the arbitration proceedings in person or through an attorney.14 5
134. Id. 110-505(14).
135. Id. 110-505(4).
136. Interview with Lu Kun, arbitrator for FETAC (Oct. 10, 1992) [hereinafter Kun
Interview].
137. Id.
138. Arbitration, supra note 127, 10-505(33).
139. "Although the arbitration tribunals formed to conduct references are independent,
they may nevertheless submit questions involving state principles and polices to [FETAC] for
guidance. This is to ensure that the arbitration carried out will conform to the official policy
on foreign trade." LEE, supra note 92, at 22.
140. Interview with Audrey Yu, attorney at Denton, Hall, Burgin & Warrens, in Hong
Kong (Aug. 3, 1991).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Kun Interview, supra note 136.
144. Sacks, supra note 110, at 5-86.
145. Id.
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FETAC's willingness to educate a foreign investor about Chinese
arbitration procedures should help alleviate investor fears of being
disadvantaged during the arbitration process.
While a case before the Chinese courts may only be litigated by
an attorney who is a Chinese national,146 FETAC rules allow the
foreign party to choose as their advisor, an attorney or representa-
tive who is a Chinese citizen or a foreign citizen. 47 Furthermore,
an attorney may act on behalf of the investor as long as he or she is
granted power of attorney. 48
B. Can the Chinese Arbitral Body Competently Resolve
Disputes Involving Technical Contracts?
Unlike other international methods of arbitration, Chinese ar-
bitration involves a combination of both conciliation and arbitra-
tion.1 49 "Subject to consent of both parties, conciliation can be
conducted at any time prior to or after the commencement of arbi-
tration proceedings and before a final arbitral award is granted." 15 °
The Chinese prefer that the two parties negotiate a compromise
through conciliations, as illustrated by a joint venture case involv-
ing a Hong Kong corporation and a Chinese corporation in
Guangzhou.15
1
In this case, one of the two shareholder's of a Hong Kong cor-
poration (shareholder A) signed an agreement with the Chinese cor-
poration to set up a factory to produce a certain commodity. 152 The
Hong Kong corporation was to contribute the equipment and tech-
nology, and the Chinese company agreed to provide all the raw
materials, the factory building, and workers. 153 The contract also
set forth conditions for the goods to be re-exported.15 4 The joint
venture was successful until the shareholder who did not sign the
146. Sanqiao Interview, supra note 124.
147. Id.
148. In the past, the arbitration proceedings were open session hearings in which em-
bassy officials were able to observe the arbitration and evaluate whether the awards were
fairly allocated. Id. However, under the new rules, article 25 of the Arbitration Provisions
states that arbitration tribunals shall not hear cases in open session unless both parties request
that an open session be held. Arbitration, supra note 130, % 10-505(25).
149. Tang Houzhi, Arbitration: A Method Used by China to Settle Foreign Trade and
Economic Disputes, 4 PACE L. REv.519, 521 (1984).
150. Id.
151. Interview with [name withheld by request], in Hong Kong (Aug. 3, 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Confidential Interview]. The interviewee consented to the interview on the condition that
his identity and those of the parties remain unidentified.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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agreement (shareholder B) informed the Chinese party that share-
holder A had left the Hong Kong corporation. 5 Shareholder B
then persuaded the Chinese corporation that it should sign another
contract with him so that he could continue the joint venture. 156
However, when shareholder A discovered what had happened he
returned to the Chinese party and asked that they comply with the
original agreement.1 57 When shareholder A and the Chinese party
failed to resolve the dispute through mediation, they applied to
FETAC for arbitration." 8 The arbitration panel's first step was to
request that both parties attempt to resolve the problems on their
own through conciliation.159 This method proved successful in this
case."6 The head office of the Guangzhou corporation which was
located in Beijing found another factory in Beijing with which the
original agreement could be carried out.1 61
In another case, involving the sale of goods, conciliation took
place during the arbitration proceedings. 162 In this case, a foreign
firm signed a contract with a Chinese company for the shipment of
a certain tonnage of goods to be delivered in separate shipments to a
port designated by the foreign firm.1 63 The agreement also con-
tained a penalty clause for non-performance fixed at five percent of
the non-performed amount of the contract.164
The Chinese party obtained the necessary export permit license
and shipped the goods.1 65 However, the goods were mistakenly sent
to the wrong foreign firm.1 66 When the Chinese party tried to ob-
tain a second export license their request was denied.1 67 Because
the Chinese firm could not export the goods, it proposed that the
contract be cancelled.1 68 The foreign corporation did not agree to
the proposed cancellation of the contract, and applied to FETAC
for arbitration, claiming the amount stated in the penalty clause,
damages for loss of profits, and expenses incurred.1 69 The Chinese
155. Id.
156. Confidential Interview, supra note 151.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Confidential Interview, supra note 151.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Confidential Interview, supra note 151.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
[Vol. 9
CHINESE ARBITRATION
party argued that it should not be responsible because the failure to
deliver the goods was due to the export permit not being granted, a
circumstance beyond its control.17 During arbitration, the tribu-
nal, with the consent of both parties, went into a conciliation
process.1 71
The only instruction the arbitration tribunal made was that
since the Chinese corporation had an export license for the first lot
of goods, the Chinese corporation should at least be responsible for
its failure to deliver that particular lot. 171 The foreign firm was not
allowed to claim both the penalty and damages for its lost profits. 173
Consequently, both parties settled on a reasonable compromise, in
which the Chinese party would pay a specified amount as compen-
sation and 60% of the arbitration costs, and the foreign party would
bear the remaining 40%. 17 4
In meeting the goals of arbitration to resolve problems through
third party dispute resolution and compromise, the Chinese method
has many positive aspects. It increases the probability that the dis-
puting parties will continue to do business in the future. However,
there are serious drawbacks to the Chinese arbitration process. For
example, FETAC arbitration provisions have no discovery proce-
dures for interrogatories or document production. Under Article 6
of the FETAC rules, the party requesting arbitration must attach
documentation of the facts of the dispute to the arbitration applica-
tion.1 75 The party receiving the application must, in reply, submit
any defenses and relevant documents within 45 days to the arbitra-
tion commission and the plaintiff. 176 However, neither party is obli-
gated to submit documents or answer any questions posed by the
opposing party. 177 During arbitration, both sides are required to
produce facts supporting their complaints or defenses. 178
This absence of a comprehensive discovery mechanism is a ma-
jor weakness in the PRC arbitration, as exemplified by the serious
disadvantage imposed upon the less informed party entering into
the arbitration. In addition, parties can introduce new evidence at
formal hearings without notice.' 79 Consequently, a party might be
170. Id.
171. Confidential Interview, supra note 151.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Arbitration, supra note 127, 1 10-505(6).
176. Id. 1110-505(8).
177. See id., 11 10-505(6)-(13).
178. Id., 10-505(6), 10-505(9).
179. Confidential Interview, supra note 151.
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put in a position in which it cannot adequately protect itself, having
no time to adequately review new evidence and raise defenses.
Although FETAC rules give the arbitrator and the arbitration
committee power to conduct their own investigation, gather further
evidence, and subpoena materials for the purpose of arbitration, the
rules are silent with regard to the power to subpoena witnesses.' 80
Since the power to subpoena a witness is not explicitly set forth in
the procedural rule, the arbitration commission is not obligated to
help parties obtain the witnesses. Therefore, a foreign party may
find it impossible to compel an unwilling witness to testify.
Another concern for investors is that presiding arbitrators se-
lected by the Chairman of the Arbitration Commission from the
Arbitrational Commission's list of arbitrators, may not have the
background knowledge to resolve disputes of a technical nature.
This concern is mitigated by the ability of the arbitration tribunal to
consult experts and/or appraisers in disputes involving sophisti-
cated technical issues.18 An expert may be a Chinese national or a
foreign organization or citizen.'1 2 However, the rules provide no
language to ensure that the selected expert or appraiser be a neutral
and unbiased party.
C. Enforcement of Awards
FECL contains provisions allowing parties to appeal to Chi-
nese courts for enforcement of arbitral awards.18 3 In order to seek
enforcement of arbitral awards in courts under foreign jurisdiction,
FECL expressly allows foreign investors and technology suppliers
to look to the United Nations Convention of the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Conven-
tion) "'84 for guidance. When China entered the New York Conven-
tion, it agreed that awards involving international commercial
matters rendered in other contracting states would be enforced
within the PRC. The convention states that:
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as bind-
ing and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure
of the territory where the award is relied upon, under the condi-
tions laid down in the following articles. There shall not be im-
posed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or
180. Arbitration, supra note 127, 10-505(26).
181. Id. 10-505(28).
182. Id.
183. Id. T 10-505(38).
184. Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards of New York of 1958,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
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charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to
which this Convention applies than are imposed on recognition
or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.
185
Consequently, under the New York Convention, joint ventures
and other suppliers of technology are subject to the procedural rules
of the territory where the enforcement of arbitral awards is to be
made.186 If an arbitration award is to be enforced in China, Article
195 of the PRC Civil Procedure Code,187 which describes judicial
enforcement of arbitration decisions, will be applied. 
188
However, the New York Convention contains defenses to the
enforcement and recognition of arbitration awards.1 89 For example,
if the party against whom the award is invoked can show proof of a
valid defense (e.g., incapacity of the parties, improper notification of
arbitration proceedings, or invalidity of the arbitration proceeding
as contrary to the contractual agreement), 190 the award will not be
enforceable. In addition, parties may protest enforcement of the
award in China on public policy grounds. The New York Conven-
tion states:
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be
refused if the competent authority is in the country where recog-
nition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of set-
tlement by arbitration under the laws of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to public policy of that country.191 (emphasis added).
As far as investors engaged in technology transfers through
joint ventures are concerned, subpart (a) should not be a problem
because FETAC via the CCIPT is capable of settling all foreign
investment disputes. However, subpart (b) may pose an obstacle
because the term "public policy" is vague and open-ended. Accord-
ingly, the "public policy" exception is considered a notoriously flex-
ible method of avoiding the requirements of Chinese law.192
Those countries which have treaties with China and have in-
cluded provisions for the enforcement of awards are in a much bet-
185. Id., art. 111.
186. Id.
187. The Law of Civil Procedure of the People's Republic of China (adopted March 8,
1982) [hereinafter CPC].
188. See Sacks, supra note 110, at 5-525.
189. New York Convention, supra note 184, art. V.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Cohen, supra note 5, at 525.
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ter position than other countries.1 9 3 For example, bilateral and
multilateral treaties significantly increase the effectiveness of the
foreign awards, by limiting the grounds available for denial of rec-
ognition and enforcement.1 94
Although there is a strong likelihood that foreign arbitral
awards will be enforced in China, there is still uncertainty regarding
the enforcement of Chinese arbitrational awards. China's Civil pro-
cedure codes are too loosely drafted to adequately enforce an arbi-
tral award made by FETAC. If the person against whom the award
is made can present evidence, the court, after examination and ver-
ification, can rule to deny enforcement of the PRC arbitral
award. 195
In addition, public policy is grounds upon which enforcement
of an arbitral award may be denied. According to Article 260, if the
People's Court determines that execution of an award would be
against public policy, the court shall deny execution. 196 This lan-
guage leaves too much discretion in the Chinese courts, and too
little security for the party seeking to enforce the award. For exam-
ple, a public policy exception could be unpublished inter-depart-
mental "neibu"' 197 documents that are kept secret for security
reasons, rules not yet drafted, ideology or judicial preference.' 98
Moreover, the Code fails to provide any procedural protection
for parties seeking to enforce the award against the PRC. For ex-
ample, there are no provisions in the Code for hearings at which the
party enforcing the award may raise an objection to an Article 260
motion. Therefore, if the person against whom the award is being
sought raises a 260 motion, the party awarded damages through
arbitration has no recourse if the court decides that the award
should not be enforced. In addition, there is no provision which
allows FETAC to intervene or assist the party to the recipient of a
decreed award. In effect, FETAC has no means of enforcing its
193. Additionally, modern treaties, statutes and judicial developments have greatly con-
tributed to facilitation of enforcement of arbitral awards through recognition of transnational
arbitral awards. Farina, supra note 105, at 170 n.215 (citing Delaume, Court Intervention in
Arbital Proceedings, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DisPUTs (C. Carbonneau ed. 1986) at
222).
194. Id.
195. CPC, supra note 187, art. 260 (1991).
196. Id.
197. Neibu regulations are expressions of policy and politics that China does not wish to
make public but that have the force of law. Anna Han, The China Trade, RECORDER, Dec.
18, 1991, at 8.
198. See id.
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awards. Consequently, Article 260 leaves the enforcement of arbi-
tration awards to the whim of Chinese judges.
Consider a recent joint venture case,199 in which a foreign cor-
poration (plaintiff) entered into a ten year contractual joint venture
contract to produce a product with a Chinese corporation (defend-
ant) in which the total registered capital was the sum of
$300,000,000 Hong Kong dollars. The plaintiff contracted to con-
tribute an investment of $180,000,000 Hong Kong dollars with
$150,000,000 to apply to the purchase of necessary equipment (60%
of the total registered capital).2" The defendant's capital contribu-
tion totalled $140,000,000 Hong Kong dollars with $100,000,000
used for the purchase of necessary equipment and machinery." 1
The defendant was to receive 70% of the products; it was agreed
that losses and profits would be split equally.2"2 Both parties lo-
cated a German corporation which agreed to sell its machinery to
the joint venture.20 3 The defendant sent his agent to the German
corporation to negotiate the sale terms.' 4 While in Germany, the
defendant's agent sought the machinery for about $257,465 Hong
Kong dollars, but had the German corporation request a credit
transfer for almost $384,725 from the plaintiff, alleging it as the ac-
tual cost of the machinery.20 5 The plaintiff sent the requested
amount to the German Corporation, leaving the defendant with ap-
proximately $127,260 Hong Kong dollars profit.20 6
When the plaintiff discovered what the defendant had done, it
applied to FETAC for arbitration proceedings. 2 7 Each party chose
their respective arbitrators and FETAC selected the presiding arbi-
trator according to the FETAC arbitration rules.20 8 However, on
the date arbitration was scheduled to commence, the defendant
failed to attend.20 9 After the arbitration tribunal reviewed the facts
and evidence, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. 10
The judgment award decreed that: 1) the defendant must pay its
share of the capital contribution (40%) of the joint venture to the
199. Confidential Interview, supra note 151.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Confidential Interview, supra note 151.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Confidential Interview, supra note 151.
210. Id.
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plaintiff within 30 days or the plaintiff could invoke the Guangzhou
county laws; 2) the defendant must return the $127,260 Hong Kong
dollars within 30 days, or an interest rate of 7% would be added;
and 3) the defendant must compensate for all losses within 30 days
or an interest rate of 7% would be added to the total sum due and
unpaid.21
In this case, although the judgment award went to the plaintiff,
the arbitration rules do not necessarily guarantee enforcement.
Under the first provision, if the defendant fails to pay the plaintiff,
the defendant may invoke the courts in Guangzhou county.212 The
question then becomes one of whether the Guangzhou county
courts will enforce an arbitrational award against their local "com-
rade." Consequently, it is likely that many local courts may honor
the local party's request not to have the award enforced. The plain-
tiff's success or failure will depend on which judge is presiding,
which party has the most influence in the local community, and,
perhaps, luck. Without an arbitrational procedure that can ade-
quately enforce its own judgment awards, FETAC cannot be con-
sidered viable means on which parties can rely for dispute
resolution.
V. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS
Although China has developed and formalized its arbitration
system, procedural and structural defects remain. The most obvi-
ous of these are the unfair rules, such as those that allow parties to
introduce new evidence during arbitration without notice. Conse-
quently, the primary goal of promoting friendly dispute resolution
within the Chinese arbitration system may be severely undermined.
In order to make the system more fair, the Chinese legislative
body should adopt a discovery mechanism which bars introduction
of evidence into arbitration if such introduction will result in preju-
dice against a party. A modification of FECTAC rules to allow a
party to subpoena witnesses is also necessary. Furthermore, if the
Chinese want to encourage technology transfer investments through
joint venture enterprises, as well as establish FECTAC as an inter-
nationally recognized and respected arbitral center, the entire Chi-
nese system must cooperate in the enforcement of arbitral awards.
This includes modifying the availability of the PRC Civil Procedure
260 motion. For example, an objection provision to a 260 motion
211. Id.
212. See Arbitration, supra note 127, 1 10-505(38).
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should provide the party enforcing the arbitral award with the op-
portunity to state both the reasons against the granting of a 260
motion and the reasons supporting the enforcement of the arbitral
award. In addition, FETAC should be able to intervene through
written statements or oral presentations on behalf of the party en-
forcing the arbitral award. This intervention could be accomplished
by a written statement of support by FETAC or via oral presenta-
tions on behalf of the party enforcing the arbitral award.
However, the prevalent problem of local courts favoring their
local residents may still exist even if the Civil Procedure Code is
amended to allow objections to a 260 motion. One remedy to allevi-
ate or avoid local favoritism is to have a clause permitting a 260
motion objection to be transferred to a neutral court for review. In
the alternative, a special court or entity to handle enforcement of
arbitral awards could be established.
Regarding the provision which stipulates that issues are to be
adjudicated according to public policy, the Chinese legislative draft-
ers should establish some reliable guidelines. For instance, Chinese
administrative bodies from the central government to local munici-
pal levels2" 3 need to eliminate neibu regulations so that all parties,
including foreigners, will be aware of the operative laws and
requirements.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although China has taken significant steps towards realizing
its goals of (1) reaching a 1990 level of technological development
common to Western industrialized nations by the year 2000, (2) dif-
fusing technology into rural areas, (3) developing an infrastructure
and natural resources, and (4) promoting high technology in critical
areas, it is far from reaching these goals. While the enactment of
the Technology Regulations, Implementing Regulations, and other
legislation advances China's interest in achieving its goals, the re-
maining flaws in the Chinese system are a major obstacle to maxi-
mizing foreign investment. Consequently, the rules must be
modified to alleviate investor concerns. For example, the rules and
regulations applicable to foreigner investors should contain detailed
language and minimal bureaucratic ambiguity. In addition, the ap-
proval process should be simple and straightforward so that inves-
tors can develop both reliance and confidence in the PRC system.
213. See generally JAMES A. TOWNSEND, POLITICS IN CHINA 82-87 (2d ed. 1980) (dis-
cussion of the political organization of the PRC, including administrative entities at the state,
provincial, county, and municipal level).
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Because current laws and regulations are not sufficient to meet these
needs, foreign investors should negotiate favorable terms that incor-
porate protections of the investor for neutral dispute resolution.
Furthermore, if China hopes to meet its development goals
through foreign investment that encourages technology imports, it
must offer foreign investors a fair, reliable and predictable environ-
ment in which to do business and resolve disputes. Unfortunately,
for the investors and Chinese businesses, the present Chinese arbi-
tration rules fail to meet these goals. In spite of the fact that the
Chinese system is patterned after international arbitration organiza-
tions, the effectiveness of FETAC is undermined by problems such
as the lack ofjudgment award enforcement procedures and/or laws.
Thus, it is highly likely that until FETAC demonstrates that it is a
fair tribunal, capable of issuing reliable and enforceable judgments,
foreign investors will continue to be wary of investing in the PRC.
